Changelog — HARP
Changelog
Version history of the HARP specification suite.
v0.2 — Current draft
Section titled “v0.2 — Current draft”HARP-CORE v0.2
Section titled “HARP-CORE v0.2”- Artifact canonical JSON format defined
- SHA-256 hashing over signable form
- Ed25519 decision signatures
- Replay protection via nonce + expiry + cache
- Fail-closed enforcement model
HARP-PROMPT v0.2
Section titled “HARP-PROMPT v0.2”- Prompt classification taxonomy
- Prompt hash computation
- Metadata tagging for prompt artifacts
HARP-SESSION v0.2
Section titled “HARP-SESSION v0.2”- Session lifecycle (create, snapshot, close)
- Snapshot hashing
- Session state management
HARP-TRANSPORT v0.2
Section titled “HARP-TRANSPORT v0.2”- Gateway message routing
- E2E encryption (X25519 + AEAD)
- Zero-knowledge relay design
HARP-KEYMGMT v0.2
Section titled “HARP-KEYMGMT v0.2”- Key generation and device binding
- Key rotation recommendations
- Hardware-backed storage guidance
HARP-THREATMODEL v0.2
Section titled “HARP-THREATMODEL v0.2”- Threat analysis for all protocol components
- Mitigation requirements
- Out-of-scope threats documented
HARP-GOVERNANCE v0.2
Section titled “HARP-GOVERNANCE v0.2”- Specification governance process
- Versioning and extension rules
HARP-COMPLIANCE v0.2
Section titled “HARP-COMPLIANCE v0.2”- Conformance levels defined
- Test vector requirements
HARP-RECIPIENT-WRAP / HARP-APPROVAL-SET v0.2 Draft
Section titled “HARP-RECIPIENT-WRAP / HARP-APPROVAL-SET v0.2 Draft”- Per-device DEK wrap (
aes-256-gcm+hpke-x25519-v1); gateway never holds the DEK - Frozen ApprovalSet snapshot;
firstValidandcountwait GET /v1/recipient-keyspublic directory; key-directory substitution documented in THREATMODEL- 1:1
AES-256-GCM/ pairing profile unchanged